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The Pragmatic Passion of Stephen Breyer
Now in his twelfth year as a Supreme Court Justice, Stephen Breyer has
written an important book, Active Liberty,' which crystallizes a fundamental set
of beliefs about the American Constitution and his role as a Justice. Taking
Active Liberty as the entry point, this piece places Breyer's book in the wider
context of his judicial opinions and activities as a Justice - and, as such, seeks to
provide a preliminary sketch of Breyer's distinctive place in American law
today.
I. VOICE
Active Liberty emphasizes one theme that Breyer says runs through our
primal document and that should help guide how we determine its meaning in
a wide variety of cases: the idea of democratic participation. Breyer argues that
our Constitution embodies not only a commitment to "negative liberty"
(protecting citizens from government interference with their lives) but also a
commitment to "active liberty" -creating and fostering a form of democratic
government in which the people "share the government's authority" and
actively "participat[e] in the creation of public policy."2 Viewing the
Constitution in this way, Breyer argues, will lead to better constitutional
interpretations and a more "workable democratic government. 3
To understand Active Liberty - and the Justice who penned it - we must
first understand what it is not. It would be a mistake to see this book-as some
of its critics have-as offering a "theory" about the Constitution. Breyer
explicitly disclaims that he is setting forth a "theory."4 Although a longtime
1. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005).
2. Id. at 33.
3. Id. at 34.
4. Id. at 7, 110.
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professor at Harvard Law School before becoming a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals in 1980 (he was an administrative law scholar whose writings
focused on the practice of economic regulation), Breyer is not by temperament
a theorist- certainly not in the sense currently fashionable in the legal academic
world. And his judicial opinions since becoming a judge have not seemed to be
shaped by general theories.
Instead, his book is best seen as an activity of induction. Here Breyer is
open about what the book represents: At a certain point in his judicial career,
after deciding an enormous number of individual cases and writing a large
number of opinions that explain conclusions in terms of legal doctrine and
practical policy, he has looked for a "pattern" in his own work.' The theme of
democratic participation, then, is not only what he has found in his study of
the framing of our Constitution and in American history, but also a thematic
pattern that he sees in his own judicial decisions. This is something, one
senses, that he had not seen until recently as such a significant and unifying
thread in his own prior work. He is not providing a roadmap for deciding
future cases. Breyer describes his ideas as "themes," an "approach," an
"attitude," not a "theory," and emphasizes that they can "help" decide close
cases, rather than dictate results without regard to other interpretative tools.
6
Nor is this book a comprehensive statement of Breyer's views of the law or
a full portrait of Breyer the Justice. Certainly the book's substantive theme of
democratic participation, however strongly Breyer emphasizes it, is only one of
his substantive preoccupations as a constitutional judge-themes and values
that include, one must add, a certain distrust of populist democracy and a faith
in elite expertise. 7 The part of Active Liberty that may capture Breyer's behavior
as a judge more fully is the book's other main theme, which is methodological:
Judging is a pragmatic and purposeful activity in which interpretation and
decision must always be attentive to the purposes of legal provisions, the
multiplicity of factors involved in specific cases, and the practical consequences
of judicial decisions, and should not focus exclusively on textual exegesis and
uncovering original understandings.
5. Id. at 11O-11; Linda Greenhouse, Court Veteran Remembers a Scary Start, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 16,
2006, at A31 (quoting Breyer as saying that "'[w]riting the book, the doing of it, forced me
to work through and find the coherence"' in his opinions).
6. BREYER, supra note i, at 6, 7, 9, 1, 12, 18-19, 34, 50, 53, 56, 110-11.
7. Active Liberty is particularly interesting to read alongside a book that Breyer wrote as a U.S.
Court of Appeals judge shortly before his appointment to the Supreme Court, which
emphasizes the importance of administrative expertise as a way to resist populist pressures
to overregulate risk. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TowARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION (1993); see also BREYER, supra note I, at 86, 102-03, 105 (recognizing some
tension between democracy and administrative decisionmaking).
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To understand the book and Justice Breyer more fully, the book is best read
alongside Breyer's judicial decisions. The true virtuoso in Stephen Breyer is
expressed through recurring decisions in specific cases, explained through
unusually compact, complex, transparent, practical, and balanced explanations
in hundreds of opinions. Breyer's decisions not only address a wider set of
substantive themes than the book, but his decisions also capture the
particularity of Breyer's approaches to concrete cases and specific legal issues.
His opinions never rest on unitary principles, including "active liberty," but
invariably draw on multiple sources of meaning. He is not a case-at-a-time
judge, but he is always engaged in the detailed particularity of specific cases,
and in many ways his distinctive excellence is that he sees that particularity so
clearly and can hold in place and attempt to balance the many factors that he
sees at stake at particular moments of decision. These are the qualities that lead
some to view him at times as too subjective or too cautious; for me and many
others, however, they are the qualities that make Breyer an exceptional
Justice-a consummate pragmatic judge. His book is an important work of
self-reflection, made especially valuable because it gives us a glimpse into the
general thinking of a judge who lives each day in the fray, with responsibilities
and preoccupations very different from a scholar's. But we should not privilege
this book over the day-to-day work of Stephen Breyer the Justice, any more
than we might privilege a poet's reflections on poetry over the poems
themselves.
The book is a manifesto of sorts, a sustained expression of his personal
approach to constitutional interpretation, and a respectful criticism of the
current Supreme Court for having "swung back too far" in the wrong direction
by "too often underemphasizing or overlooking the contemporary importance
of active liberty. ''8 Moreover, Breyer's most interesting and important
contributions as a Justice have largely been in separate opinions -expressions
of a distinctive individual voice, not the views of a Court majority.
Given this, we should recall how Breyer was perceived and described when
President Clinton nominated him to the Court in 1994. He was perceived,
correctly I think, as a consensus-builder. 9 He was described as a moderate-
liberal Democrat: As a top staff member of the U.S. Senate's Judiciary
Committee, he had worked very effectively across party lines to find common
8. Id. at 11.
9. Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer To Be a Supreme Court
Associate Justice and an Exchange With Reporters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 909 (May 13, 1994) ("He
has proven that he can build an effective consensus and get people of diverse views to work
together for justice's sake."); Paul Gewirtz, Op-Ed., Who Is Stephen Breyer?, HARTFORD
COURANT, July 24, 1994, at Di (highlighting Breyer's "vaunted ability to build consensus.").
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ground (indeed, this explained why his nomination to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit was approved by the Republican-led Senate even
after President Carter had lost the election to Ronald Reagan'"). As a Court of
Appeals judge, he had found grounds for decision that typically produced
unanimous opinions on his court. At the time of his nomination to the Court,
some perceived him as too much of a "technocrat" -holding against him his
background in administrative law and regulatory policy, as if those fields were
inconsistent with compassion-and some perceived him as insufficiently
ardent about social causes.1 But the dominant view was that he was a
pragmatic moderately liberal judge, and a person who had a good chance of
helping a fractured Supreme Court find consensus and common ground in
decisions. 2
To a large extent, this prospect of consensus-building has proven illusory.
Justice Breyer's colleagues on the Supreme Court, it has turned out, are not
especially committed to finding consensus. They are strong individuals who
have views that they wish to express. Most significantly, this is an era of
conservative ascendancy. To the extent that there are blocs on the Court,
Breyer is part of a minority bloc. At times he crosses over (more on this below),
but on many of the most contested issues at the Court he is part of the
dissenting group of more liberal Justices. Yet Breyer, by temperament, is not
the dissenting type. He likes to solve problems, find areas of agreement, and
cooperate with others. During an interview at the Brookings Institution, he
recently suggested that in his third grade class students were graded based on
their ability to get along with others -"participating and cooperating" was
what he called it. 3 Breyer emphasized that these are good traits to develop
among citizens in a democracy; but "participating and cooperating" is also his
own style as a person, and undoubtedly his preferred style as a judge.' 4 He
found at least one colleague who substantially shared his temperament and also
io. John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 470, 492-93
(1997).
ii. See, e.g., Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo3d Cong. 369 (1994) (statement
of Sen. Howell Heflin, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (stating to Breyer that "the
word 'technocrat' has been frequently used in descriptions about you" and "that technical
approach has sometimes been criticized").
12. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 9.
13. Stephen Breyer, Remarks at the Brookings Institution 51 (Oct. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/2oo5lo17Breyer.pdf.
14. In this respect, he also emphasized "the importance for everyone of getting on with people
you disagree with." Id. at 45. He also cites de Tocqueville as noting that the reason American
democracy works is because people here "learn how to work together." Id. at 51-52.
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his instinct for moderation - Sandra Day O'Connor - and their colleagueship
would itself be an interesting subject for future scholarly study. But because
their political starting points were frequently different, and because her more
centrist position on the Court allowed her a somewhat wider field for coalition
building, Breyer and O'Connor never emerged as a consistent partnership on
the Court.
Although Breyer has never flagged in his optimism that consensus is
possible in most cases,"5 he has not become a great consensus builder on the
Court. Instead, he has emerged as an individual voice, and often in dissent or
in concurring opinions.' 6 He has certainly adjusted to his role, but it cannot
have been how he expected it would turn out. His book, Active Liberty, reflects
a continuation of this development of an individual voice and perspective, and
provides an additional path for spreading the influence of his ideas.
II. IDEAS
Breyer's commitment to active liberty has two different implications for his
view of how constitutional cases should be decided. In different situations, it
can lead either to judicial deference to the democratic process, or to judicial
invalidation of legislation that limits democratic participation. We see various
aspects of this two-sidedness both in the examples that Breyer discusses in
Active Liberty and in his opinions as a Justice.
is. It is revealing that in his book, as well as in public appearances, Breyer repeatedly
underscores that the Justices reach broad agreement in most cases and also that in the
Court's conference room he has "never heard one member of the Court say anything
demeaning about any other member of the Court, not even as a joke." Breyer, supra note 13,
at 44; see also BREYER, supra note i, at 11o.
16. This is not to slight the many cases in which Breyer speaks for the Court in majority
opinions. Many are of large significance. See e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)
(concerning abortion rights); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (deportation of
aliens). Some reveal a remarkable snatching of partial victory from defeat. See, e.g., United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting in part). And in many more
ordinary cases, by Supreme Court standards, Breyer demonstrates an easy command of the
multiple tools of legal interpretation to reach sensible results and bring majorities along. See,
e.g., Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005) (construing a firearm statute). Moreover,
we do not know the consensus-building role of Justices who silently join majority opinions,
even though they may have been instrumental in producing the majority. Interestingly,
according to the Harvard Law Review's statistics for the 2004 Term, Justice Breyer was tied
with Justice O'Connor as the Justice most frequently in the majority in cases in which the
Court was not unanimous, suggesting the possibility that he has been developing a larger
consensus-building role. See The Supreme Court 2004 Term - The Statistics, 119 HARv. L. REV.
415, 423 tbl.I(D) (2005).
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First, Breyer's theme that "courts should take greater account of the
Constitution's democratic nature" leads him to be a strong advocate and
practitioner of "judicial modesty"17- the courts' deference to the decisions of
other more democratic branches of our government, branches that tend to
involve fuller democratic participation by citizens. In a recent study of the
decisions of the Supreme Court between 1994 and 2005, Chad Golder and I
have shown that Breyer has voted to overturn provisions of congressional
statutes the least number of times of any of the Justices-a showing that
surprised those who had associated "judicial activism" with the Court's more
liberal wing, of which Breyer is usually a part. (Indeed, according to the study,
"conservative" Justices voted to overturn congressional provisions the most
frequently.)" 8
Second, in certain contexts, Breyer's theme leads him to justify a more
active role for courts in giving concrete life to the Constitution's "democratic
nature"-by striking down decisions of other branches of government that
limit democratic participation. The early pages of Active Liberty suggest that
Breyer is more interested in the second, more activist implication of his theme
than the first.' 9 But in fact most of his major examples in the "Applications"
section highlight his deference to the choices made by other institutions (for
example, deference to Congress on campaign finance legislation, deference to
Congress on Commerce Clause and related federalism questions, deference to
the University of Michigan Law School on affirmative action).2 There are
certainly many situations in which Breyer has voted to strike down the acts of
other institutions as unconstitutional -for example, the death penalty for
juveniles21 and mentally retarded persons,22 school voucher programs that
involve religious schools, 3  restrictions on abortion,' laws punishing
homosexual conduct,"5 some antiterrorism detention measures, 6 California's
17. BREYER, supra note i, at 5.
18. Paul Gewirtz & Chad Golder, Op-Ed., So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2oo5, at
A23.
19. See BREYER, supra note i, at S-6.
20. Id. at 49, 60-65, 79-84.
21. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2oos).
22. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
23. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-29 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
24. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (Breyer, J.).
as. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
26. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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"three strikes" law,27 certain restrictions on political speechs and sexually
explicit speech, 9 and copyright protections lasting an extremely long period of
time." But his work as a judge, like his book, shows him to be a liberal who
gives genuine deference to other branches of government.
The single most important area of Breyer's work on the Court has been his
opinions on the First Amendment, in which he has developed a unique and
pathbreaking approach to issues of freedom of speech. Indeed, in my
judgment, Breyer's are the most important new ideas about the First
Amendment on the Supreme Court since Justices Brennan and Black. The
entire active liberty theme in the book seems to have developed out of insights
and approaches that Breyer first developed in concurring and dissenting
opinions in free speech cases during his first years on the Court. Justice
Breyer's core idea is that the First Amendment's role is not simply to protect
individuals from direct government restraints on speech. The First
Amendment's freedom of speech seeks not only to protect a negative liberty,
but also to promote active liberty by encouraging the exchange of ideas, public
participation, and open discussion. In other words, the purpose of protecting
the freedom of speech in the First Amendment is to promote a system of free
expression that provides speakers wide opportunities for public and private
expression, provides listeners diverse sources of information, fosters greater
democratic participation, and creates greater public confidence in the
democratic process.
This has various implications. For one thing, it leads Justice Breyer to argue
that in many First Amendment cases the particular restriction on speech is not
the only free speech interest involved. Rather, the restrictions on speech in the
challenged laws may actually enhance the speech of some, even though they
limit the speech of others. Constitutionally protected interests "lie on both
sides of the constitutional equation."3 In such cases, Breyer argues, it is
27. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 35-62 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77-83 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
28. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 66 5-86 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the
dismissal of the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
29. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). But see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 6S6, 676-91
(2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding the Child Online Protection Act constitutional).
30. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
31. BREYER, supra note 2, at 48; see also Barmicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (" [T] he question before us... implicates competing constitutional concerns.");
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)
("[C]onstitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation."); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 226 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part) ("[T]here
are important First Amendment interests on the other side as well.").
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inappropriate to assess a restriction on speech using strict scrutiny. Rather, the
right question is whether the laws "impose restrictions on speech that are
disproportionate when measured against their speech-related benefits."32
Questions can be raised about whether this recalibrated balance is appropriate
and whether courts can be trusted to implement it-as I have discussed
elsewhere33 -but none of these undermine the importance of Breyer's insights
and his challenge to the Court's current approach to First Amendment issues.
In a variety of separate opinions, Justice Breyer has used his new approach
to the First Amendment to reach conclusions that differ from his colleagues.
Most importantly, at a time when campaign finance laws were still under the
heavy cloud created by Buckley v. Valeo, 4 Breyer wrote a concurrence in Shrink
v. Missouri that showed greater tolerance for laws limiting campaign
contributions and spending so as to "democratize the influence that money...
may bring to bear upon the electoral process," and "to "encourag[e] the public
participation and open discussion that the First Amendment itself
presupposes."3 Here, Breyer foreshadowed the Court's later decision-if not
the precise reasoning- in McConnell v. FEC,36 upholding the main provisions
of the "McCain-Feingold" federal campaign law of 2O0277
Active Liberty gives particular attention to the issue of campaign finance,
and also to Breyer's view that courts should distinguish political speech from
commercial speech and allow greater regulation of the latter. Breyer has used
his approach to resolve cases differently from the Court majority in a variety of
other contexts as well, which show more fully the far-reaching implications of
his distinctive ideas. For example, he would allow Congress greater leeway to
require opening cable TV to more diverse voices in order to promote the
democratic objective of "'assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of
information sources,"' even though the speech interests of the cable owners are
somewhat restricted."s He has indicated a greater willingness to uphold
legislation that restricts the media in order to promote privacy, in part because
protecting privacy of communications itself encourages people to speak more
32. BREYER, supra note i, at 49.
33. Paul Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 139, 193-98.
34. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
35. 528 U.S. at 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
37. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in
scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.).
38. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 18o, 227 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part)
(quoting Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994)).
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freely and thus promotes a more vibrant system of free expression. 9 Justice
Breyer has also been more receptive than the Court majority to upholding
restrictions on speech when there is an important competing value that is not
itself a speech value. For example, he wrote a dissenting opinion stating that he
would uphold a restriction on the programming leeway of cable operators
when the value on the other side was protecting children from indecent
programming.40
A second area where Breyer has made major contributions as a Justice is
federalism. Limiting national powers in federalism cases was one of the
hallmarks of the Rehnquist Court, and Breyer has been a leading dissenter in
this area and he gives it distinctive attention in his book.41 In cases such as
United States v. Lopez, in which the Court has struck down congressional
enactments as exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause powers, Breyer has
emphasized the importance of deferring to Congress because of its plausible
conclusions and comparative advantage in assessing social facts (the empirical
detail of his dissent shows him writing in the tradition of Justice Brandeis42),
and because "the public has participated in the legislative process at the
national level" (invoking the active liberty theme)." His book gives somewhat
greater attention to federalism decisions striking down congressional
legislation because it "commandeers" state officials44 or violates the Eleventh
39. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 71-73 (discussing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001)).
40. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 835-47 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). That said, there are also situations involving what he considers core political
speech when Breyer might impose stricter limitations on speech regulation than his
colleagues. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 665-86 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
the dismissal of the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
41. BREYER, supra note 1, at 56-65.
42. For Breyer's interesting and perhaps self-reflective discussion of Justice Brandeis, see
Stephen Breyer, Justice Brandeis as Legal Seer, Brandeis Lecture at the University of
Louisville School of Law (Feb. 16, 2004), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/sp-o2-16-o4.html.
43. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); BREYER, supra
note i, at 62. The majority in these cases accuses Justice Breyer of abdicating any judicial
role in putting limits on Congress' Commerce Clause powers and relying exclusively on the
political safeguards of federalism. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-68. Breyer's response is that
"two centuries of scientific, technological, commercial and environmental change..., taken
together, mean that virtually every kind of activity, no matter how local, genuinely can affect
commerce .... Since judges cannot change the world..., Congress, not the courts, must
remain primarily responsible for striking the appropriate state/federal balance." Morrison,
529 U.S. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
44. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992).
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Amendment by imposing damage liabilities on states4 S-and here Breyer
sounds an interesting if not completely convincing variant on his active liberty
idea. He criticizes these decisions largely on the ground that they will decrease
active liberty at the local level, reduce the role of local governance, and produce
less flexible and more national forms of regulation. These decisions seem easier
to criticize on different grounds - both on originalist grounds and on the
ground that Breyer emphasizes in his dissents in the Commerce Clause cases:
that Congress is the preferred institution for deciding where the federal/state
balance lies in these instances. Moreover, Breyer's arguments here rest in part
upon predicted consequences of striking down the laws in question that
subsequent experience may not have borne out. But Breyer's arguments in his
dissents and book are original and important, and also have the advantage of
moving beyond the common national sovereignty critique of the Rehnquist
Court's federalism decisions to suggest that the Court majority was
undermining its own professed commitment to localism.
Among the book's other applications of Breyer's active liberty theme, one
stands out because it is the only specific area of law that Breyer discusses that
he had not previously addressed in his judicial opinions, and it is a major one:
affirmative action. Justice Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in
Grutter v. Bollinger,46 the landmark opinion upholding the use of affirmative
action in the educational context. But until this book, Breyer had not
previously explained his own views on the subject. The Madison Lecture in
2001, in which Breyer first developed the democratic participation theme,
contains only the briefest mention of affirmative action in the specialized
context of race-conscious districting.47 Given that Grutter was decided after the
Madison Lecture, it is reasonable to think that the general ideas in the Madison
Lecture helped Breyer to see deeper links between his theme of democratic
participation and the affirmative action issue; that Grutter gave Breyer the
opportunity to think through and apply his new understandings in an actual
case; and that the section on affirmative action in Active Liberty allowed him to
present his ideas in his own voice. Thus, to a student of Breyer the Justice, the
book's discussion of affirmative action contains particularly interesting news -
45. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Bd. of Tr. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
46. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
47. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, The Fall 2001 James Madison Lecture at
New York University Law School (Oct. 22, 2OO1), available at
http://ww.supremecourtus.govpublicinfo/speeches/spl 1o-22-o1. html.
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and it is important news, because Justice O'Connor's departure from the Court
has made affirmative action one of the most important issues in play on the
new Court.
We do not know what role Justice Breyer played in helping to develop
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter,48 but the passages in the
opinion that Breyer emphasizes in Active Liberty certainly echo his own ideas
about democratic participation. For Breyer, the justification for affirmative
action in the context of higher education does not rest fundamentally on either
the idea that it is a remedy to overcome the effects of past or present
discrimination or the idea that, under our First Amendment, universities
should receive distinctive deference in making educational choices. Nor does he
emphasize the contributions that a diverse student body makes to education in
the university setting itself-the rationale in Justice Powell's famous Bakke
opinion,49 the central rationale offered by the University of Michigan itself in
Grutter, and a significant part of Justice O'Connor's opinion. Rather, in Active
Liberty Breyer justifies affirmative action as "necessary to maintain a well-
functioning participatory democracy.""0 He reads Justice O'Connor's opinion
as ultimately resting on this active liberty and democratic participation theme,
and quotes the following passage in which, he says, she drew her various other
arguments together:
"[N]owhere is the importance of... openness more acute than in the
context of higher education. Effective participation by members of all
racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the
dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.... [Indeed,] the
path to leadership [must] be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and
48. We do know that they were the only two Justices who voted to uphold the affirmative action
program used by the University of Michigan's Law School in Grutter but also voted to strike
down the affirmative action program used by the University of Michigan's undergraduate
college challenged in the companion case of Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). Because
their two votes determined the outcomes in these exceptionally important cases, it is
plausible to think that they discussed the cases. Breyer wrote only a brief separate opinion in
the cases, stating his votes and adding that even though he disagreed with the dissenters in
Gratz, he agreed with them that "government decisionmakers may properly distinguish
between policies of inclusion and exclusion." id. at 282 (Breyer, J., concurring).
49. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
5o. BREYER, supra note i, at 82.
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integrity of the educational institutions that provide this training ....
[And] all [must] participate ....
Although this is indeed a quotation from O'Connor's majority opinion,
Breyer's ellipses and brackets focus on Breyer's own interpretation-
culminating in the last sentence, which is largely a reconstruction and which
focuses attention on the theme of "participation."
Breyer then adds, in altogether his own words:
What are these arguments but an appeal to principles of solidarity, to
principles of fraternity, to principles of active liberty? They find some
form of affirmative action necessary to maintain a well-functioning
participatory democracy.... [If affirmative action were outlawed, too]
many individuals of all races would lack experience with a racially
diverse educational environment helpful for their later effective
participation in today's diverse civil society. Too many individuals of
minority race would find the doors of higher education closed; those
closed doors would shut them out of positions of leadership in the
armed forces, in business, and in government as well; and too many
would conclude that the nation and its governmental processes are
theirs, not ours. If these are the likely consequences - as many
knowledgeable groups told the Court they were -could our democratic
form of government then function as the Framers intended?5 2
Active Liberty discusses a variety of other areas of constitutional law-
ranging from privacy and religious freedom to criminal procedure and
desegregation -but there is at least one noteworthy omission. Unmentioned,
and perhaps understandably so, is the most momentous and controversial
constitutional case of Breyer's tenure at the Court: Bush v. Gore, 3 the case that;
effectively ended the Presidential election of 2000 and one that certainly
engages the book's theme of democratic participation.'
s. Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 3o6, 332-33 (2003) (citations omitted)).
52. Id. at 82-83. Note his emphasis on "consequences" as a guide in giving meaning to the Equal
Protection Clause and his reliance on the amicus briefs to inform him about real-world
consequences.
53. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
s4. Breyer also does not mention two other cases with overtones of presidential politics in which
he wrote opinions: Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 710-24 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring), the
famous case in which President Clinton unsuccessfully sought to defer a sexual harassment
suit against him until his term of office ended, in which Breyer wrote an opinion formally
styled as "concurring in the judgment" but that was in many respects a dissent, and Rubin v.
United States ex rel. Independent Counsel, 525 U.S. 990 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the
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No sketch of Breyer can ignore the case, however. Breyer's dissent in Bush
v. Gore is a cri de coeur, as impassioned an opinion as Breyer has ever written,
addressing what he clearly saw as a calamity for the Supreme Court. Even
though written under extraordinary time pressures, it both dissects the
majority's legal arguments with analytic power and clarity, and also expresses
his vision of the Supreme Court as a national institution. Uncharacteristically,
Breyer's dissent begins with a rhetorical blast of a pair of "wrong" and
"wrong": "The Court was wrong to take this case. It was wrong to grant a
stay.""5 And what immediately follows is a statement of the opinion's insistent
theme, that even though "[t]he political implications of this case for the
country are momentous[,] . . . the federal legal questions presented . . . are
insubstantial," 6 and that the proper role for the Supreme Court here was to be
restrained.
Breyer's legal analysis takes apart the majority's particular arguments one
by one. But the particular force of Breyer's opinion is in Part II, in which he
pleads for the Supreme Court to stay out of this ultimate political moment in a
democracy. Under both the Constitution and Congressional statutes drafted
after the wrenching experience of the contested 1876 election, Breyer argues,
Congress has the ultimate authority and responsibility to count electoral votes.
Anticipating one of Active Liberty's themes - indeed, perhaps partly animating
it-Breyer writes: "However awkward or difficult it may be for Congress to
resolve difficult electoral disputes, Congress, being a political body, expresses
the people's will far more accurately than does an unelected Court. And the
people's will is what elections are about."17
Drawing upon Professor Alexander Bickel's writings about the 1876
election, in which Justices of the Supreme Court played a key role, Breyer
closes his opinion with lessons from that history and with anguished concern
for the Court as an institution. Describing the Justices' role in the 1876 election,
but perhaps also expressing his own anxiety about how to understand the
majority's actions in Bush v. Gore, Breyer observes that "[m]any years later,
Professor Bickel concluded that [Justice] Bradley was honest and impartial." s8
But the role of Justice Bradley and other Justices in the 1876 election "did not
denial of the writ of certiorari), in which Breyer wanted to consider the establishment of an
evidentiary privilege to limit testimony by Secret Service agents protecting the President.
Each opinion is marked by a characteristic focus on the practical consequences for the
constitutional interests at stake.
55. 531 U.S. at 144 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 155.
58. Id. at 156.
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lend that process legitimacy. Nor did it assure the public that the process had
worked fairly, guided by the law. Rather, it simply embroiled Members of the
Court in partisan conflict, thereby undermining respect for the judicial
process."59 Turning explicitly to Bush v. Gore, he wrote that one reason for
judicial self-restraint is that the "sheer momentousness" of this kind of case
"tends to unbalance judicial judgment."6O "And, above all, in this highly
politicized matter, the appearance of a split decision runs the risk of
undermining the public's confidence in the Court itself. That confidence is a
public treasure. It has been built slowly over many years, some of which were
marked by a Civil War and the tragedy of segregation." 6' Here, Breyer seems to
be reminding us of Brown v. Board of Education, which he has invoked on many
occasions as the paradigmatic case of how the Court's reserve of legitimacy
allowed it to bring transformative benefits to the justice of our country. Breyer
adds: "[That public confidence] is a vitally necessary ingredient of any
successful effort to protect basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself....
[W]e do risk a self-inflicted wound-a wound that may harm not just the
Court, but the Nation.
62
None of the carefully polished prose about democratic participation and
judicial modesty in Active Liberty has more power or resonance than Breyer's
dissent in Bush v. Gore, hastily crafted in the midst of battle, propelled by the
particularity of litigation, and informed by the history it remembered and
recognized was being made.
I have focused thus far on Active Liberty's substantive theme about the
Constitution- the theme of democratic participation. But the book also
develops important methodological themes about how to approach the task of
legal interpretation. Judges, Breyer argues, should consider the purposes of the
legal provision in question and the practical consequences of various possible
interpretations, and not look only to the language of the law, the original intent
of its adopters, or precedent. In addition, Breyer argues, particularly in close
cases, judges should avoid wooden doctrinal formulas and rigid rules, because
they frequently need to balance a variety of factors, make pragmatic judgments,
and see matters of degree as dispositive. Approaching legal interpretation in
this way, Breyer says, will not only determine legal meaning most accurately
5g. Id. at 157.
60. Id. (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184 (1962)).
61. Id. at 157.
62. Id. at 157-58.
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but also promote democratic values more fully and pragmatically. Breyer's
methodological arguments present an important intellectual challenge to the




The most significant criticism of Breyer's methodological approach, even
by those who praise the book, is that it leads to judicial subjectivity and legal
indeterminacy. 6' Breyer anticipates the criticism in a full section of his book
titled, with characteristic directness, "A Serious Objection." Although Breyer
does not put it this way, much of the criticism reflects an exaggerated view that
leeway can be eliminated from Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court,
however, is frequently interpreting general provisions of the Constitution or
imprecise provisions in federal statutes. A Justice has available a wide range of
tools for interpreting these provisions, drawing upon a variety of sources (text,
precedent, legislative history, and so forth). Inescapably, there is leeway for
choice -choice in method of interpretation, and choice in the meaning given to
a provision -choices that will inevitably be shaped in part by a judge's
experience and fiundamental beliefs and choices that will require the judge to
make reasonable judgments and not just engage in logical deduction. This is
especially so with cases decided by the Supreme Court, which are the typically
borderline and difficult cases that have no clear answers. One of Breyer's
contributions is that he acknowledges these inescapable truths and is explicit
about the basis for his own choices.
Breyer's basic answer to the concerns about subjectivity is to argue that (1)
alternative approaches have subjective elements as well; (2) his approach has
more constraints than critics will acknowledge; and (3) even if there is
somewhat more leeway for judicial choice in his method, there are more than
compensating benefits. Breyer is especially strong in summarizing the various
indeterminacies and subjectivities of originalism. Concerning constraints in his
own method, Breyer emphasizes that examining purposes and consequences
does not displace the important - and importantly constraining - role that text,
history, and precedent also should play.
Two of Breyer's other arguments about constraints warrant special
emphasis since they tend to be ignored or downplayed by his critics. The first
is Breyer's argument that his method brings to the surface factors that are often
in play but undisclosed in other methods, and that the transparency of his
method is itself an important constraint. "There is no secret. There is no
63. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(1997).
64. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer's Democratic Pragmatism, 115 YALE L.J. 1719, 1732-36
(2006).
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hidden agenda. What you see is what you get," Breyer has stated.6' His
opinions often rest upon many diverse factors, but their relevance is
explained-and when there is a pivot point of difficulty or judgment, Breyer
will tell you. Transparency is a check on the judge, both because it disciplines
the judge's own thought and because the judge is opening himself to
disciplining criticism from others. Breyer also argues that his method requires
the judge to act with a sense of humility and caution-to defer to other
institutions often, and, when intervening, to take small bites in recognition of
the complexity of both the method and the issues. This is a point at which
Breyer's substantive theme of democratic participation and his methodological
themes come together, because they both counsel the judge to defer frequently
to other decisionmakers.
Cynics may be dismissive of invocations of humility by those with power,
but humility and caution are particularly appropriate to demand of judges in a
democracy, and Breyer's record supports that he practices what he preaches. In
the study mentioned earlier, Breyer was the most deferential to Congress of
any of the Justices on the Court. (The criticisms of Breyer's book by Robert
Bork and George Will, that it is a license for judicial activism or the
announcement of an ambitious liberal program, simply ignore what Breyer
says and the clear evidence of his cautiousness and deference to other
institutions.66) Breyer's opinions often rest upon the combination of so many
factors that they leave to the future how he would decide closely related cases,
itself an expression of a constraining humility and caution.
Of course, purposes are not always easily characterized, and consequences
not always easy to predict. The question is whether an interpretive effort - such
as originalism- that deems purposes and consequences off limits produces
better law than interpretation that gives attention to these factors and is
accompanied by a self-conscious effort to minimize (eliminate would be
impossible) the imposition of the judge's own personal value choices. Breyer's
ultimate argument is that even if his method may sometimes provide judges
more room for judgment than a strict originalist or textualist approach, there
are more than compensating benefits -a law that better carries out the
purposes of the Constitution and of statutes, and that better serves the country.
Here, of course, Breyer's method merges with his understandings of
substantive constitutional meaning. For example, to say that any restriction on
speech in a negative liberty sense triggers strictest scrutiny might be more
determinate than Breyer's approach, but for Breyer it would be wrong. Rigid
65. Breyer, supra note 13, at 17.
66. Robert H. Bork, Enforcing a "Mood," NEw CRITERION, Feb. 2006, at 63; George F. Will, Mr.
Breyer's 'Modesty,'NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26, 2005, at 72.
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doctrinal rules might reduce a judge's leeway for judgment, but Breyer believes
that the right constitutional meaning is often found in a context-specific
balancing of multiple factors, judgments of "proportionality,"6" and matters of
"degree." 6
8
A further question, which Breyer does not really address, is whether his
method can work well in the hands of the ordinary judge without Breyer's
social understanding and good sense. It takes a true virtuoso to play
Beethoven's late piano sonatas -and the ordinary pianist would be advised to
play simpler though inferior music. In the hands of others, perhaps the results
would be less pleasing. This is a common critique by those who favor legal
rules over standards,6" and it is certainly a fair question to ask about Breyer's
approach.
As both Richard Posner and Cass Sunstein note in this issue," Breyer's
policy orientation does a considerable amount of the work in the decisions he
reaches -his commitment to democratic participation and his methodology do
not by themselves produce his results. Other judges might conceivably invoke
his themes and use his method and reach results that I, for one, would cheer
less, because they draw different implications from a commitment to
democratic participation, identify purposes of legal provisions that are less
congruent with my understanding, and assess likely consequences in less
plausible and less insightful ways. But Breyer's method requires transparency
at the points at which judgment or policy comes into play, and transparency
not only constrains but also invites candid dialogue. Breyer's method also
insists upon a genuine attitude of humility and deference, and that prevents
excessive judicial intrusion in democratic processes. If you believe, as Breyer
believes, that leeway and some measure of policymaking are inescapable parts
of judicial decisions in the distinctively difficult, borderline, and contested
issues that reach the Supreme Court, the comparative advantages of Breyer's
approach become clearer. It may not eliminate debates in particular cases, but it
67. BREYER, supra note i, at 49. For a brief discussion of Breyer's reliance on the concept of
proportionality, see Gewirtz, supra note 33, at 195-98.
68. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The majority
believes [my] conclusions rest upon practical judgments that at most suggest the statute is
unwise, not that it is unconstitutional. Legal distinctions, however, are often matters of
degree. And in this case the failings of degree are so serious that they amount to failings of
constitutional kind." (citations omitted)).
69. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 1o6 HARv. L. REV, 22 (1992).
70. Richard A. Posner, Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J. 1699 (20o6);
Sunstein, supra note 64.
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puts those debates on a more open terrain. And it leaves great room for debate
to be had, and choices made, in more democratic institutions.
I noted at the outset that Active Liberty should be seen as a work of
induction, in which Breyer discerned a pattern and themes in his earlier judicial
opinions. Perhaps not surprisingly, writing this book (and its precursors, the
2001 Madison Lecture and the 2004 Tanner Lectures) seems to be having an
effect on Breyer's continuing judicial work.
I have already noted the apparent effect his democratic participation theme
seems to have had on his approach to the 2003 campaign finance cases and
affirmative action cases (in which he did not write major opinions). But we can
also see the democratic participation theme playing out in less prominent cases
in which Breyer has written opinions. In Board of Education v. Earls," for
example, Breyer split off from his liberal colleagues and concurred in a
judgment upholding a school district's policy of conducting drug testing of
students participating in competitive extracurricular activities. At a pivotal
point in his concurrence he notes:
When trying to resolve this kind of close question involving the
interpretation of constitutional values, I believe it important that the
school board provided an opportunity for the airing of these differences
at public meetings designed to give the entire community the
opportunity to be able to participate in developing the drug policy. The
board used this democratic, participatory process to uncover and to
resolve differences, giving weight to the fact that the process . . .
revealed little, if any, objection to the proposed testing program.72
In another case, Ring v. Arizona, Breyer actually reversed his conclusion in an
earlier case, and concluded that "the Eighth Amendment requires that a jury,
not a judge, make the decision to sentence a defendant to death."73 1His
conclusion rests upon his view that, given the extensive debates about the
appropriateness of the death penalty, jury sentencing "will help assure that, in
a particular case, the community indeed believes application of the death
penalty is appropriate, not 'cruel,' 'unusual,' or otherwise unwarranted."7 4 Put
71. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
72. Id. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
73- 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
74 Id. at 6 18.
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another way, the jury's role will provide fuller democratic participation by the
community in the death penalty decision.
We can also see a new self-conscious deployment of his methodological
emphasis on looking to purposes and consequences in interpreting laws. Most
striking is Breyer's application of this method-which was fully articulated in
the 2004 Tanner Lectures- in the two 2005 cases involving public displays of
the Ten Commandments that were decided after he delivered those lectures.
7
The Ten Commandments cases are especially noteworthy because Breyer
ended up being the pivotal Justice in each case, providing the decisive fifth vote
to allow the display in one case and the decisive fifth vote to disallow it in the
other. 76 As the only Justice to reach different conclusions in the companion
cases, he was at the center of the Court, but there alone. It cannot have been an
easy place to come to rest. But there is nothing tentative in Breyer's opinions -
the tone is self-confident, the voice of a judge comfortable with his method of
decision and where it has led him. And the method is explicidy all about the
purposes of the Establishment Clause and the consequences of one
interpretation over another' - Breyer's most developed use of these concepts in
any opinion he has written.
Breyer's earlier opinions, we have seen, evolved into this book. His recent
opinions demonstrate that his book is now producing evolutions in his
opinions, which are making more self-conscious use of ideas developed in his
book.
III. CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
One final part of the sketch is necessary: Breyer's theme concerning the
citizen's active participation in public life is expressed not only in his legal ideas
but also in his own activities of civic engagement. Several times in his book
Breyer quotes John Adams's phrase extolling citizens' "positive passion for the
public good"'8 - and the phrase fits Breyer himself, not just as a description of
his personality but also of the way he understands his judicial role. A Supreme
75. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, Harvard University Tanner Lectures on
Human Values (Nov. 17-19, 2004), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/spll-17-o4.html. Indeed, after the Tanner Lectures were delivered and he had
written his opinion in the Ten Commandments case, Breyer added a section on those cases
to the chapter on methodology in Active Liberty. BREYER, supra note i, at 122-24.
76. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005); McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 125 S.
Ct. 2722 (2005).
77. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
78. BREYER, supra note 1, at 3, 135.
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Court Justice can help to educate society. A Supreme Court Justice needs to
understand society.
He believes that one of his roles is to educate and engage the general public
about the Supreme Court and about our government institutions. His opinions
are remarkably jargon-free, and, for all of their analytic brilliance, they are
usually written as if they are to be read by ordinary citizens. His opinions have
no footnotes (they are full of citations, of course, but these are embedded in the
text), which I take to be a symbolic assertion that his opinions are arguments to
the public, not a scholar's writings. He is one of the Court's most active (and
wittiest) participants at oral argument; and because oral arguments often
receive as much press coverage as the Court's actual opinions, this in practice,
if not intent, provides another channel for him to educate the public. He sees
great value in amicus briefs filed with the Court since they inform him about
the real world of things and the potential consequences of legal rulings.79 But
he also remains involved with society directly.
One reason that Active Liberty is an important book is that it aspires to reach
a wider audience of readers than legal scholars, other judges, and lawyers.'s
The book seeks to contribute to the public's understanding of not only the
Supreme Court, but also, and perhaps above all, the public's own role in our
democratic system. Justice Breyer has done a remarkable number of interviews
related to the publication of this book -for example, he has done television,
radio, print and other interviews with George Stephanopoulos (ABC News),
Larry King (CNN), Jim Lehrer (PBS), Charlie Rose (PBS), Linda Greenhouse
(New York Times), Jeffrey Toobin (New Yorker), Nina Totenberg (NPR), and
Stuart Taylor (National Journal), among others. While taking pains to explain
how the Supreme Court works, these interviews all emphasize the public's own
responsibilities to participate in our political life, and are acts of public
encouragement.
Even before the book appeared, Breyer was willing to speak to general
audiences, to university entities, to bar associations and other nonprofit
organizations, and to participate in conferences of all sorts. 8 Some of his
colleagues lead quite insular lives as Justices, whether out of a sense of self-
protection or propriety, but Breyer has resisted that. He participates in
79. Id. at 41-42.
so. Breyer has recounted that the origin of this book was a meeting at the Carnegie Foundation
where he, Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy were discussing how to teach high school
students about the Constitution. See Breyer, supra note 13, at 7, 8.
Si. A partial listing of Breyer's speeches and public appearances is provided on the Supreme
Court's website at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/speeches.html
(last visited Mar. 22, 20o6).
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Washington, D.C.'s social life, and he spends considerable time in his longtime
home of Cambridge, Massachusetts, as a member of that community. (Indeed,
the book jacket's description of Breyer has only two sentences: the first says
that he is an associate justice of the Supreme Court, and the second says that
"He is a resident of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C." -in
that order.)
Like most of his colleagues, at the Court he often receives delegations from
foreign countries, most typically judges from other countries' courts. In turn,
like other of his colleagues, he also regularly accepts invitations to speak abroad
about the American legal system- sometimes under the auspices of the U.S.
Department of State. In this respect, he is essentially a diplomat. The American
legal system and our commitment to the rule of law is widely admired around
the world - it is part of our "soft power" as a country. A Supreme Court Justice
speaking to a foreign audience about our country and its legal system brings
particular attention to them, improves understanding of our system, and
contributes to America's standing in these countries." In the course of these
visits and exchanges, Justice Breyer himself learns about the work of foreign
courts. This, along with the increasing practice of lawyers in cases before the
Supreme Court bringing foreign materials to the Court's attention, has made
Justice Breyer a leading proponent of the idea that it is sometimes valuable for
our courts to consider the experiences of other countries in the course of
making decisions -not because those foreign decisions in any way bind us or
shape the meaning of U.S. legal texts, but because they may provide useful
insights and even empirical experience with particular kinds of issues."s
Breyer also believes that a Supreme Court Justice is part of the American
government system, not apart from it. This understanding of his role is
expressed in numerous and, at times, unusual ways. For example, Breyer is
single-handedly carrying forward the old tradition that members of the
Supreme Court attend the State of the Union address. The rest of his
colleagues no longer attend. (This year was an exception, apparently because
the State of the Union address took place the same day that Justice Samuel
Alito was sworn into office.) The attendance of Justices at the State of the
Union address, however traditional, certainly produces some awkward
moments, since the President's remarks are often highly political and
82. For example, Justice Breyer also regularly attends the annual Global Constitutionalism
Seminar at Yale Law School, which brings together justices from supreme courts and
constitutional courts around the world with the Yale faculty to discuss issues of common
interest.
83. Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address Before the 97th Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Apr. 4, 2003), in 97 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 265 (2003).
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nowadays members of Congress frequently either stand to cheer or put on
sullen expressions for the TV cameras; an attending Justice typically sits
benignly, neither cheering nor disapproving. But Breyer's persistence in
attending reflects, I think, not only his sense that members of the Court should
participate in this symbolic event. It also reflects one aspect of Breyer's
characteristic optimism: Yes, we have separate branches of government and
they each must check the other; but we are in the end one Union with a set of
common purposes.
Breyer believes this. His public interviews and speeches are filled with
optimism.8 4 He emphasizes again and again the large area of common ground
within the United States, in understandings about the Constitution, and even
concerning cases that come to the Supreme Court. His optimism is expressed
not simply in overt expressions of faith in American institutions, but in his
basic problem-solving style. He believes that common ground can be found.
And when a problem can't be solved-in the sense that common ground for a
sensible solution can't be found-he emphasizes that the question at issue is a
close one, that each side has something to be said for it. Many others have
contrasted Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia in terms of their interpretative
methods and judicial philosophies. But there is also a marked contrast in their
temperaments, including their judicial temperament: One is a witty
provocateur, the other is a cheerful problem solver. They share a zest for
expressing their different temperaments, but one emphasizes differences and
enjoys the posture of adversary, the other emphasizes commonalities and
enjoys the role of conciliator.
Breyer's optimism, especially about American institutions, explains why
Bush v. Gore was such a significant event for him -it was a major challenge to
his faith in the essential wisdom of our institutions and the nonpartisanship
and professionalism of judging. But, significantly, in his limited public
comments on the case since it was decided he has said only two things: First,
he thinks he was right; and, second, the country accepted the Court's decision,
and this is a sign of how strong our institutions are and how strong the public's
faith in our institutions is.8s One senses that he has bracketed Bush v. Gore in
his understanding of both the Supreme Court and the country. It was a terrible
mistake, but we have moved on-and we can move on without drawing harsh
lessons that Supreme Court decisionmaking is inherently or pervasively
partisan or corrupt. It was a terrible mistake, but our country will survive it-
and Breyer's faith has survived it.
84. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 13, at 39.
85. Id. at 38-39.
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Of course, one consequence of Bush v. Gore is that it indeed did change
Breyer's life. President Bush is reshaping the Supreme Court with his talented
and strongly conservative appointments, and this has made it more likely that
Breyer will remain in the minority bloc for the foreseeable future, perhaps for
the remainder of his career. It is difficult to see Breyer playing a larger role as a
consensus builder now that Justice O'Connor has left the Court. There is the
chance, of course, that given the lawyerly professionalism of the two new
appointees, John Roberts and Samuel Alito - and the fact that they, like Breyer,
enjoy the detailed analysis of cases and seem often to decide cases narrowly-
Breyer will find significant areas of common ground with them, even in
borderline and particularly important cases. In any event, although usually
characterized as part of the conservative bloc, Justice Kennedy will retain his
comparatively centrist and at times unpredictable place on the Court, so Breyer
still might play a role as a shaper of majority positions if common ground is
found with Justice Kennedy.
In that role, it is important to remember that Breyer himself is at times an
unpredictable liberal. To mention just a few examples, he has split with
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg on a variety of important cases,
including some free speech cases,8 6 one of the Ten Commandments cases,8' the
affirmative action case involving the University of Michigan's undergraduate
college,"8 and some criminal procedure cases,8 9 among others. There is also, of
course, the chance that a Democrat will be elected President in 2008 and that
the Court can be reshaped yet again before Breyer retires so that he becomes a
shaper of more progressive majority positions. But at the moment all of this is
most uncertain.
Thus, Breyer is a judge of extraordinary quality, but has no clear majority
on the Court to follow his lead. If this does not change, what will Breyer's path
be? Greatness as a Justice, as the examples of John Marshall Harlan, Louis
Brandeis, and Robert Jackson demonstrate, does not require a commanding
role as leader of majorities. It can be based on a powerful judicial identity; a set
of ideas; a method and an integrity that gain deeper recognition and influence
over time; and even influential roles played outside the Court's daily work. We
86. Ashcroft v. ACLU 542 U.S. 656, 676-91 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); United States v. Am.
Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 215-20 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514, 535-41 (2oo1) (Breyer, J., concurring); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 835-47 (200o) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868-73 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
88. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 281-82 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
89. E.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822
(2002).
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can predict that, for Justice Breyer, the theme and method set forth in Active
Liberty will give his ideas an influence that individual judicial opinions almost
never can have. He will continue to be a powerful individual voice on the Court
with a distinctive approach, method, and set of ideas - implementing the
pragmatic strain in American thought in a way rarely seen within the American
judiciary. Over time, one can imagine that Justice Breyer will find other specific
areas of law that he can rethink in detail with a new perspective, as he has
already done with his innovative approach to the First Amendment. One can
also expect him to continue his own activities of civil engagement outside the
courthouse, filling crucial gaps in the American public's understanding of our
public institutions, and acting as an unusually effective public diplomat for
American legal institutions and for the United States abroad.
He may even find the time for other important books like Active Liberty. We
are lucky to have this one.
Paul Gewirtz is the Potter Stewart Professor of Constitutional Law, Yale Law
School. He is especially grateful to Chad Golder for his extensive and invaluable help
with this effort, and to Robert Wiygul for his excellent research assistance. In the
interests offull disclosure, the author notes that he was thanked by Justice Breyer on
the acknowledgments page ofActive Liberty.
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